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a b s t r a c t 
The paper studies with an endogenous growth model how the merger and acquisition 
(M&A) affects the aggregate growth rate. We model the M&A as a capital reallocation 
process, which can increase both productivity and growth rates of ﬁrms. The model is 
tractable and greatly consistent with patterns observed in the M&A at the micro level. 
Matching our model to the data, we ﬁnd that prohibiting the M&A would lead to the re- 
duction of the aggregate growth rate of US economy by 0.1% and the reduction of the 
aggregate TFP by 5%. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
There are two capital reallocation processes on the market. The ﬁrst is that ﬁrms can buy or sell individual machines; 
the other is that ﬁrms can buy or sell individual ﬁrms through the merger and acquisition (M&A). Many papers focus on the 
ﬁrst capital reallocation process and its aggregate effect, such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . By contrast, this paper studies 
the second process, M&A, and its aggregate effect. 
Macroeconomists typically do not distinguish the two capital reallocation processes and neglect the M&A. 1 M&A is con- 
sidered as a process, in which talented managers acquire assets or employees, like buying machines. Macroeconomists as- 
sume that new acquired ﬁrms directly get acquiring ﬁrms’ productivity and then they run together, but do not specify 
 I am grateful to Boyan Jovanovic for his advice. I would also like to thank Jason Abaluck, Serguey Braguinsky, Jess Benhabib, Luis Cabral, Gianluca 
Clementi, Allan Collard-Wexler, Alexander Coutts, Joel David, John Lazarev, Matthew Khan, Virgiliu Midrigan, Alessandro Lizzeri, Rafael Robb, Peter Rousseau, 
Edouard Schaal, Venky Venkateswaran, Gianluca Violante and seminar participants in NYU, Washington University in St. Louis, SOM Yale, SMU, Sydney 
University, 2014 North American Econometric Society meeting and Tsinghua Macro Workshop for their insightful discussions and comments. The previous 
version of the paper was circulated as “Mergers and Acquisitions: Quantity vs Quality and Aggregate Implications”. 
E-mail address: jhxu@smu.edu.sg 
1 In this paper, we focus on the horizontal M&A, which is deﬁned as the M&A within the same industry (4 digit sic code). The share of the horizontal 
M&A in all M&A transations is about 52% (1978–2012). 
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how the mechanism works ( Lucas Jr, 1978; Manne, 1965 ). 2 However, acquirers need to absorb the organization capital of 
acquirees in M&A, such as management systems and selling channels. As a report from Toyota says, “(the acquired ﬁrm) 
is an integrated system and diﬃcult to digest”. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the M&A from the other capital 
reallocation process. 3 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the M&A from an aggregate economy perspective. Macroeconomists investi- 
gate how ﬁrms grow because ﬁrm growth is a key determinant of the macroeconomic growth ( Luttmer, 2007 ). Firms can 
either grow “in house” through the internal investment (getting more machines) or grow “externally” through the M&A. 4 
The latter, M&A, has become a very common ﬁrm growth strategy. In US, approximately 30% of ﬁrms are involved in the 
M&A in the last a few decades. 5 Totally, the M&A expenditures have averaged around 5% of annual GDP. 6 Thus the M&A is 
not only critical at the ﬁrm level, but also signiﬁcant at the aggregate level. 
The goal of this paper is to quantify the effect of M&A to the aggregate growth rate. We build an endogenous growth 
model, in which ﬁrms are allowed to invest through the M&A or internal investment. The technology of internal invest- 
ment is conventional: ﬁrms get new machines by paying convex costs. However, the M&A technology is different: the M&A 
costs depend on what kind of ﬁrms to buy. In other words, it is easier for acquiring ﬁrms to digest targets with similar 
productivity. We make this complementary M&A technology assumption based on M&A patterns observed in the data, that 
(un)productive ﬁrms are more likely to buy (un)productive targets (a positive assortative matching pattern). 
As costs of internal investment are increasing and convex, ﬁrms can enjoy lower investment costs by smoothing the 
total investment on M&A and internal investment. Therefore, the existence of M&A offers ﬁrms another way to expand with 
lower costs. M&A leads to a higher ﬁrm growth rate, and further improves the aggregate growth rate. Our model predicts 
that the aggregate growth rate would decrease by 0.1% if ﬁrms can only grow through internal capital accumulation. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature in three aspects. First, we contribute to the growth literature by adding a 
new ﬁrm growth channel: Should ﬁrms expand through internal investments or M&A? Most existing growth models neglect 
the latter, M&A. In our model, we ﬁll this gap: the model distinguishes M&A and internal investments by introducing the 
M&A technology, which is consistent with existing discussion. Quoting from Prescott and Visscher (1980) , “Organization 
capital is not costlessly moved, however, and this makes the capital organization speciﬁc.”7 Moreover, Rob and Zemsky 
(2002) show that the cost of transferring organization capital is low when two ﬁrms are similar. The model, taking these 
theories as the microfoundations, discusses the growth effect of M&A in a highly tractable way. 
Second, we contribute to the corporate ﬁnance literature by extending M&A research from ﬁrm level to aggregate level. 
Corporate ﬁnance researchers are extremely interested in whether M&A can increase ﬁrms’ eﬃciency. Most research con- 
cludes that M&A can increase ﬁrms’ eﬃciency, but some research ﬁnds that after the M&A, ﬁrms’ eﬃciency may be lowered. 
We provide a useful benchmark to study the aggregate effect of M&A on eﬃciency. 
Third, the paper contributes to the theoretical research of competitive matching model, developed by Roy (1951) . 
Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) and Geerolf (2013) extend the research into “one to many” assignment model. They study 
the matching of one ﬁrm with multiple workers in a static environment. But our model is dynamic and has endogenous 
aggregate growth. To our knowledge, both extensions are novel. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Further in Section 3 , we develop the model, 
which is analyzed in Section 4 and whose quantitative results are explored in Section 5 . We conclude the paper in Section 6 . 
2. Related literature 
We are going to mention several other related papers in the literature. First, the paper relates to certain theoretical pa- 
pers modeling M&A and studying its beneﬁts and costs. 8 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) explain M&A as a simple capital 
reallocation process. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) build a theory of M&A based on an asset’s complementarity as- 
sumption. Perhaps, the most related paper to ours is David (2013) , which develops a structural model that M&A gains come 
from (1) the complementarity between acquiring and target ﬁrms’ assets and (2) capital reallocation. We also use the com- 
plementarity and capital reallocation assumptions, but go beyond the David (2013) by exploring how M&A gains and costs 
2 The assumption is reasonable if buying ﬁrms is considered the same as buying machines. Recent researches often use this assumption, such as to 
understand how ﬁnancial friction ( Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Midrigin and Xu, 2014 ) and how asymmetric information ( Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008 ) 
affect the capital reallocation. 
3 Readers may wonder evidence to support the assumption that the M&A process is different from reallocation of used capital. We take the aircraft 
market as an example. We study the pattern of used aircraft reallocation: buyers do not buy aircraft from similar ﬁrms. This pattern is different from the 
pattern of M&A, in which acquirers buy targets similar as themselves (we will show this pattern later). Due to data restriction that in most used capital 
market we cannot observe sellers’ and buyers’ information at the same time, we are not able to show more markets as aircraft. We discuss it in the 
appendix . 
4 In this paper, “internal investment” means creating new capital, while M&A is a process of ownership change of existing capital. 
5 Source: Compustat dataset from 1978 to 2012. 
6 Source: SDC M&A database from 1978 to 2012. 
7 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) claim the accumulation of organization capital within the ﬁrm can account 8% of US output. Our paper suggests that 
transferring organization capital across ﬁrms may be also important. 
8 Some empirical papers in the ﬁnance literature report that stock prices of acquirers fall on the M&A annoucement day and take this as evidence 
that M&A reduces eﬃciency. However, Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) show that even M&A increases eﬃciency, the acquirer’s stock price may still fall. 
Furthermore, Masulis et al. (2007) show that stock prices increase if the M&A is a cash transaction or the target is a private ﬁrm. 
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vary with ﬁrms’ productivity and size. Another difference is that David (2013) studies the M&A market with search frictions, 
through which prices are determined by bargaining. By contrast, we model the M&A market as a competitive market in 
which prices are determined by market clearing conditions. In the real world, acquiring ﬁrms often buy targets from the 
stock market, consistent with our assumption. 
Second, the paper relates to a series of empirical papers studying the productivity change after M&A. Schoar (2002) and 
Braguinsky et al. (2013) document that the productivity of acquiring ﬁrms drops temporarily during the M&A and then 
recovers, while the productivity of target ﬁrms increases. The M&A technology assumptions in our model ﬁt these empirical 
ﬁndings. 
Third, if we consider the M&A as a process to increase targets’ productivity, the paper relates to recent literature on the 
technology spread and economic growth. When studying how technology is spread, Perla and Tonetti (2014) and Lucas Jr 
and Moll (2014) assume that unproductive ﬁrms can raise productivity by imitating productive ﬁrms. We explore another 
channel of technology spread: M&A. 
Fourth, the paper also relates to papers which study the allocation of used capital ( Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007; Lanteri, 
2016 ). M&A is a special case of used capital reallocation, because not only the physical capital, but also other intangible 
capital are reallocated in the M&A. Our paper distinguishes the M&A from the used capital. 
Lastly, starting from the seminal paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , many papers argue that resource reallocation can 
explain aggregate TFP differences across countries. This paper, by modeling a particular way of capital reallocation, points 
out that capital reallocation can not only result in huge TFP differences but also generate large differences in growth rates. 
3. Model 
3.1. Household problem 
A representative consumer, who consumes aggregate consumption C t each period, maximizes the lifetime utility 
max 
∞ ∑ 
t=0 
βt U ( C t ) , β ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) 
s.t. C t + B t+1 = ( 1 + r t ) B t + t 
where B t is the risk free bond hold by the consumer and r t is the equilibrium interest rate at time t . The representative 
agent holds a portfolio of ﬁrms’ stocks and t is the lump-sum transfer of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. 
The optimal intertemporal optimization condition yields 
1 
1 + r t = β
U ′ ( C t+1 ) 
U ′ ( C t ) 
(1) 
We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty and hence the consumer has a deterministic consumption path. 
3.2. Firm problem 
There is a continuum of risk neutral ﬁrms which produce one homogeneous good. Each ﬁrm is endowed with a ﬁrm 
speciﬁc productivity z and some capital when it is born. Productivity z is ﬁxed over time. At time t if the ﬁrm has capital k 
on hand, the ﬁrm’s output is y = zk . 9 
Firms have two technologies to expand k . First, they can expand through internal investment i . This ”organic” growing 
technology is conventional in a classical growth model. The cost of investing i is I ( i , k ). We assume that I ( i , k ) is the 
same across all ﬁrms, increasing and convex on i . The second technology for ﬁrms to expand is to acquire other ﬁrms. 
In this paper, we build an endogenous acquisition cost function. We will continue to show you how we construct it. 
Basically, we construct this cost function through two steps. First, we introduce the M&A technology, which deﬁnes the 
output of the new ﬁrm after acquisition. Second, we construct an M&A market, which determines the price of target ﬁrms. 
3.2.1. M&A technology 
3.2.1.1. A simple example. Let us start from a simple example. Consider two ﬁrms ( z , k ) and ( z T , k T ). We suppose z > z T and 
there is no depreciation or further investment. In period t , z starts to acquire z T . To do so, the manager of the acquiring ﬁrm 
needs to spend time s t ∈ [0, 1] to digest the target ﬁrm. There is a forgone cost s t z for the acquiring ﬁrm in period t , and 
the output of the acquirer is ( 1 − s t ) zk . At the end of period t , the acquirer owns the target. 
Then in t + 1 , the productivity of the acquirer jumps back to its original level z , while the productivity of the target 
changes from z T to ˆ zT . If the M&A process can create value, ˆ zT should be greater than z T . The target belongs to the acquirer, 
and the output of the acquirer after M&A is zk + ˆ  zT k T . From period t + 2 , we assume that the output is the same as that in 
period t + 1 and does not change in the future. The output of the target and acquiring ﬁrm is presented in Table 1 . In period 
9 We would like the readers to think k as physical capital, while the difference of z is due to intangible assets. 
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Table 1 
Output change before and after M&A. 
t t + 1 t + 2 
Target z T k T 
Acquirer ( 1 − s ) zk zk + ˆ  zT k T zk + ˆ  zT k T 
Table 2 
Output dynamics before and after M&A. 
t t + 1 t + 2 
Target z T k T z ′ T k ′ T 
Acquirer (1 − s ) zk (1 − s ′ )(zk + ˆ  zT k T ) zk + ˆ  zT k T + ˆ  z′ T k ′ T 
Acquirer (the Hayashi Insight) (1 − s ) zk (1 − s ′ ) z(k + k M ) z(k + k M + k ′ M ) 
t , the output of target ﬁrm is z T k T and the output of the acquiring ﬁrm is ( 1 − s ) zk . In period t+1, the target ﬁrm disappears 
and the output of the acquiring ﬁrm has two components. The ﬁrst part is the capital controlled by the acquirer before 
t + 1 , zk . The second component is the output from the target’s capital ˆ zT k T . In period t + 2 , the output of the acquiring 
ﬁrm is the same as that in the period t + 1 . 
3.2.1.2. The general case. Table 2 shows a more complicated example: in period t + 1 , the acquiring ﬁrm gets another target 
ﬁrm (z ′ 
T , k 
′ 
T ) and spends s 
′ time to absorb the new target ﬁrm. In t + 2 , the output of the acquirer has three components: 
the capital before period t , the capital from the ﬁrst target ﬁrm and the capital from the second target ﬁrm. 
At ﬁrst glance, the problem seems complicated that we need to track the productivity distribution within the acquiring 
ﬁrm. To avoid it, we use Hayashi (1982) and Hayashi and Inoue (1991) : we transform the contribution of target output 
into eﬃciency units of capital, k M . k M is deﬁned as the capital level which gives the same output level as target ﬁrm if we 
impose the productivity level as z . 
k M = 
ˆ zT 
z 
k T 
In the third row of Table 2 , we show another way of writing the output of the acquirer. The output of the acquirer after 
M&A can be rewritten as zk + ˆ  zT k T = z ( k + k M ) . Hence through M&A, the acquirer expands its capital from k units to k + k M 
units. This is what we call “growing through the M&A”. 
It is worthwhile to point out a measurement problem: how do we measure ﬁrm productivity after the M&A in the data? 
To measure it, we need to know the eﬃcient units of capital after acquisition k + k M . Some people may think that we only 
observe k + k T after the acquisition. However, according to the GAAP (General Accepted Accounting Principles), the capital 
after the acquisition in the balance sheet needs be adjusted: the capital acquired is adjusted by the capital value of the 
replacement. We believe this adjustment can capture the process that k T changes to k M in the acquisition. 
10 Thus we can 
observe eﬃcient units k + k M as well. 
3.2.1.3. Functional form of M&A technology. In this paper, we assume the functional form of ˆ zT as 
ˆ zT = b ( s ) χ
(
k T 
k 
)
f ( z, z T ) ∈ (z T , z) (2) 
where b ′ ≥ 0, χ ′ ≤ 0; f is increasing on both z and z T . We also assume χ
(
k T 
k 
)
k T is increasing and concave on k T . 
Armed with the above functional forms, we have the M&A technology that transforms target’s capital into the acquirer’s 
capital as 
k M = 
ˆ zT 
z 
k T ≤ k T (3) 
3.2.1.4. Micro evidence from related literature. The functional form of the M&A technology is disciplined by the micro evi- 
dence. The key assumption in our M&A technology is that the acquirer can improve the productivity of target ﬁrm. This is 
consistent with the empirical evidence from Schoar (2002) and Braguinsky et al. (2013) that study the productivity change 
after M&A. Their ﬁndings are summarized in the left graph of Fig. 1 : (1) During the M&A process, the productivity of acquir- 
ing ﬁrms drops and then recovers in a few years; (2) Targets’ productivity ˆ zT increases but can not catch up with acquirers’ 
10 Imagine that the acquirer buys k T units of capital. If the acquirer wants to replace the acquired capital but keep the output the same, the acquirer 
needs to invest k M units of new capital. Thus the value of replacing k T is k M . 
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Fig. 1. Productivity before and after M&A Notes: This ﬁgure compares productivity of acquiring and acquired ﬁrms before and after M&A in the data and 
the model. Productivity change in the data comes from Schoar (2002) and Braguinsky et al. (2013) . They can distinguish the targets’ and the acquirers’ 
output after M&A because both of them use plant level data. Their main ﬁndings are: (1) The productivity of acquiring ﬁrms temporarily drops by 0.2%–
2.6% (Table IV of Schoar, 2002 ); (2) The productivity of target ﬁrms increases 0.4%–2.9% but can not catch up with the productivity of acquiring ﬁrms (Table 
III of Schoar, 2002 ). 
productivity. Both are consistent with our M&A technology. The right graph of Fig. 1 shows the prediction of our M&A tech- 
nology. During the M&A period, the productivity of acquiring ﬁrm drops temporarily due to the forgone cost sz and then 
recovers. The productivity of target ﬁrms increases but does not exceed z since f is a CES function and s is smaller than 1. 11 
In terms of the functional form of ˆ zT , as we assume in the Eq. (2) , b 
′ ≥ 0 implies that the acquiring ﬁrm can spend more 
time s and increase z T more. χ
′ ≤ 0 implies that if a large acquiring ﬁrm buys a small target ﬁrm (small k T 
k ), it is easier for 
the acquiring ﬁrm to absorb the target productivity. 12 Several special cases help to understand the M&A technology. 
Case 1 ˆ zT = z: In this case, the acquirer uses its productivity to replace the targets’ productivity, which represents the 
M&A technology in many capital reallocation literature . 
Case 2 ˆ zT = hs θ z T : 13 This function shows that the acquiring ﬁrm can spend time s to increase the targets’ productivity. 
This assumption is used broadly in human capital literature, such as Ben-Porath (1967) . 
11 The recovery of z and the increase of z T in the model are in one period. It is not consistent with the data. We do a robusness check by assuming the 
productivity changes take several periods, same as the data. The new assumption does not change our results too much. 
12 This assumption is consistent with Carlin et al. (2012) which ﬁnds that M&A is most valuable if one large ﬁrm acquires a similar but small target ﬁrm. 
13 In this case, we need to assume h > 1. 
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Fig. 2. Timing. 
Case 3 ˆ zT = f ( z, z T ) and f is a CES function: This assumption is consistent with papers by Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson 
(2008) and David (2013) . They explore the complementarity property between acquiring ﬁrms and target ﬁrms. Rob and 
Zemsky (2002) study the optimal design of ﬁrms’ organization and conclude that the cost of two ﬁrms merging depends on 
the productivity distance between acquiring and target ﬁrms ( Eq. (7) ). 14 
Thus the functional form of assumption in (2) is general. Many existing models are nested as special cases of our model. 
Especially, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst paper to introduce capital into the M&A technology: it is easier to digest a 
small target ﬁrm. This assumption is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings. Carlin et al. (2012) ﬁnds that M&A is most 
valuable if one large ﬁrm acquires a similar but small target ﬁrm. 
In this paper, we assume the following functional forms b ( s ) = hs θ while h ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1), χ
(
k T 
k 
)
= 
(
k T 
k 
)−( 1 −α) 
with α ∈ (0, 1) and f ( z, z T ) = 
[
( 1 − ε ) z ψ + εz ψ T 
] 1 
ψ with ε ∈ (0, 1) and ψ < 1. 15 
3.2.2. M&A market structure 
Given the M&A technology, we then construct an M&A market to endogenize the price of the target ﬁrms. There is a 
continuum of competitive and frictionless M&A markets. 
Acquirers (targets) optimally choose the market to participate in and the amount of capital to buy (sell). Technically, each 
M&A market is indexed by the target ﬁrm’s productivity in this market, z T . At time t , under the market clearing condition, 
target ﬁrm can get a price P t ( z T ) per each unit of capital. Notice that we do not assume that capital markets are indexed by 
both target productivity and amount of capital. Hence targets with the same productivity pool their capital in one market 
and acquirers can choose the desirable amount of capital. 
The endogenous acquisition cost is deﬁned as 
M t ( s, z, z T , k, k M ) = szk + P t ( z T ) k T (4) 
where k M follows Eqs. (2) and ( 3 ). A nice property of the endogenous acquisition cost is that it is homogeneous of degree 1 
on k and k M and it is increasing and convex on k M . Hence we can rewrite 
M as 
M t ( s, z, z T , k, k M ) = φM t 
(
s, z, z T , 
k M 
k 
)
k (5) 
3.2.3. Timing 
In Fig. 2 , we summarize the timing of the ﬁrm problem. At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm needs to choose 
whether to become a target ﬁrm (sell its capital) or an acquiring ﬁrm (get new capital). If the ﬁrm chooses to sell its 
capital, it produces ﬁrst and then optimally choose the amount of capital  to sell. At the end of the period, there is a 
death shock: with probability 1 − ω, it dies and all its capital is burnt. If the ﬁrm chooses to become an acquirer, it receives 
an iid random shock: with probability λ the ﬁrm has a chance to acquire target ﬁrms. If the ﬁrm has access to M&A, it can 
choose the target ﬁrm’s productivity level, z T , the amount of capital it wants to buy from the target, k T , and the time s t . If 
the acquiring ﬁrm does not have the opportunity to engage in M&A, it can only accumulate capital internally. 
14 More generally, this function is also used in human capital literature, such as Cunha et al. ( 2010 Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4)). They study the complementarity 
between parents’ and children’s abilities. 
15 In the calibration, given the parameters and functional form, we bound it to z if ˆ zT exceeds z . 
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3.2.4. Firm value functions 
Deﬁne V A t as the acquiring ﬁrm’s value, V 
I 
t as the value of a ﬁrm investing internally only and V 
T 
t as the value of a target 
ﬁrm at time t . If the acquiring ﬁrm has a chance to acquire targets, we have 
V A t ( z, k ) = max 
s,z T ( j ) ,k T ( j ) ,i 
{ 
zk − M t ( s, z, z T , k, k M ) − I ( i, k ) 
+ ω 
1 + r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 (z, k ′ ) , V T t+1 (z, k ′ ) 
]} (6) 
s.t. k ′ = (1 − δ) k + i + k M , and (5), i ≥ 0 , k T ≥ 0 , s ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] 
Eq. (6) says that the acquiring ﬁrm optimally chooses (1) the productivity of its target, z T , (2) the capital it buys from the 
target ﬁrm, k T , (3) the time it would like to spend on M&A, s , and (4) internal investment i . The current output is zk and the 
cost of investment is M t ( s, z, z T , k, k M ) + I ( i, k ) . 16 Hence the ﬁrst row in Eq. (6) is the current proﬁt. The ﬁrm discounts 
future by ω 1+ r t . In the next period, the ﬁrm needs to choose whether to become an acquirer or a target. If it becomes an 
acquirer, the ﬁrm has a chance to acquire target ﬁrms with probability λ. With probability 1 − λ, the ﬁrm can expand only 
through internal capital accumulation. Hence the expected value of the acquirer is λV A 
t+1 + ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 . The ﬁrm optimally 
chooses between the maximum of λV A 
t+1 + ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 and V T t+1 . 
If the acquiring ﬁrm does not have a chance to acquire targets, it optimally chooses internal investment and receives 
value: 
V I t ( z, k ) = max 
i 
{ 
zk − ( i, k ) 
+ ω 
1 + r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)
, V T t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)]} (7) 
s.t. k ′ = (1 − δ) k + i , i ≥ 0 
Eq. (7) is very similar to Eq. (6) except k T = 0 . It says that the acquiring ﬁrm can only invest through internal capital 
accumulation i . 
If a ﬁrm chooses to become a target, we have 
V T t ( z, k ) = max 
k ′ ≥0 
{ 
zk + P t ( z ) 
+ ω 
1 + r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)
, V T t+1 
(
z, k ′ 
)]} ) (8) 
s.t k ′ = ( 1 − δ) k − 
Eq. (8) deﬁnes the value of the target ﬁrm at time t . The ﬁrm’s current proﬁt at time t includes output zk and income 
from selling capital P t ( z ) (k 
′ − ( 1 − δ) k ) . Capital in the next period becomes k ′ . 
To close the model, we deﬁne the entry problem as follows. In period t , there is a mass of entrants e t+1 that pay the 
entry cost and draw productivity from a distribution with PDF m ( z ) whose support is [ z min , z max ]. There is one period of 
time-to-build: new entrants start to produce in the next period. Each new entrant is endowed with initial capital ˜ k t+1 , 
which is a ﬁxed fraction μ of average ﬁrm capital K¯ t in the economy. That is ˜ k t+1 = μK¯ t . The cost of entry per unit of capital 
is q and the entry process satisﬁes the free entry condition 
q ˜ k t+1 = 1 
1 + r t 
∫ 
V t+1 
(
z, ˜  k t+1 
)
m ( z ) dz (9) 
We simplify the model by making the following assumption. 
Assumption 1. I ( i, k ) = φ
(
i 
k 
)
k 
Proposition 1. Given assumption 1, ﬁrm value functions are constant returns to scale on capital k: J A t ( z ) = 
V A t 
k , J 
T 
t ( z ) = 
V T t 
k , J 
I 
t ( z ) = 
V I t 
k 
Proof. From Eq. (6) to Eq. (8) , we guess all value functions are linear on k . Then we deﬁne J A t ( z ) = 
V A t 
k , J 
T 
t ( z ) = 
V T t 
k , J 
I 
t ( z ) = 
V I t 
k . 
Substituting them into Eq. (6) to Eq. (8) , we can verify this guess. 
Deﬁne ˆ x = x 
k . Then the investment rate of the ﬁrm is 
ˆ k = k M + i 
k . Eqs. (6) to (8) can be rewritten as 
J A t ( z ) = max 
ˆ k ≥0 
{ 
z − c A t 
(
z, ˆ  k 
)
+ ω 
1 + r t 
(
1 − δ + ˆ  k 
)
J t+1 ( z ) 
} 
(10) 
s.t. c A t 
(
z, ˆ  k 
)
= min 
z T ( j ) , ˆ k T ( j ) ,s ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] 
{ 
φM t 
(
s, z, z T , ˆ  k M 
)
+ φ
(
ˆ ı
)} 
(11) 
16 We can allow ﬁrms choose different types of targets. However, as we show later, in the equilibrium, one acquiring ﬁrm only buys one type of target 
ﬁrm. 
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ˆ k M ≥ 0 , ˆ  ı ≥ 0 and ˆ k = ˆ  ı + ˆ  k M 
J I t ( z ) = max 
ˆ k ≥0 
{ 
z − φ
(
ˆ k 
)
+ ω 
1 + r t 
(
1 − δ + ˆ  k 
)
J t+1 ( z ) 
} 
(12) 
J T t ( z ) = z + ( 1 − δ) P t ( z ) (13) 
J t+1 = max 
(
λJ A t+1 + ( 1 − λ) J I t+1 , J T t+1 
)
(14) 
Eq. (10) deﬁnes J A t . We decompose the ﬁrm problem into two steps. First, we solve the investment cost of ﬁrm z , c t (z, ˆ
 k ) . 
It is deﬁned in (11) . The ﬁrst term in (11) sz is the forgone cost of M&A. The second term 
∫ 
P t ( z T ( j ) ) ˆ k T ( z T ( j ) ) dj is the price 
paid to target ﬁrms and the third term φ
(
ˆ ı
)
is the cost of internal investment. In (11) , we optimally choose target z T , ˆ k T and 
ˆ ı to minimize the cost of investment. Second, we solve the optimal investment rate of ﬁrm z in Eq. (10) . z − c A t (z, ˆ  k ) is the 
proﬁt in t . In next period, the ﬁrm expands by 1 − δ + ˆ  k . It survives with probability ω and the ﬁrm value is (1 − δ + ˆ  k ) J t+1 , 
otherwise the ﬁrm dies and gets 0. As we show later, there is only one z T acquired by the acquiring ﬁrm z in the equilibrium. 
From (11) , we can see how M&A can improve the ﬁrm growth rate. The M&A technology in Section 2 gives us an endoge- 
nous M&A cost φM t (s, z, z T , ˆ
 k M ) . It is increasing and convex in ˆ k M . In other words, ﬁrms have two technologies to expand: 
through M&A or through internal investment. Both of them have convex cost functions. The existence of M&A helps ﬁrms 
to smooth the cost of growth, hence reducing the cost of growth, as shown in Eq. (11) . 
Eq. (12) is similar to (10) , except that the ﬁrm can not acquire capital from the target hence ˆ k M = 0 . φ
(
ˆ ı
)
is the cost of 
internal capital investment. 
Eq. (13) describes the value of a target ﬁrm. Notice that when the ﬁrm chooses to become a target, it sells all its capital 
since the ﬁrm’s value function is linear in k . 17 
The free entry condition can be simpliﬁed as 
q = 1 
1 + r t 
∫ 
J t+1 ( z ) m ( z ) dz (15) 
The economic mechanism of the model can be seen from Eq. (11) and (15) . Because the existence of M&A reduces the 
cost of ﬁrm growth, the expected ﬁrm value 
∫ 
J t+1 ( z ) m ( z ) dz increases. From household’s Euler equation, we see that interest 
rate is positively correlated with aggregate growth, thus the M&A increases the aggregate growth rate. 
4. Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows. 
Deﬁnition 2. A competitive equilibrium includes: (i) two occupation sets A t , T t . If z ∈ A t (or T t ), the ﬁrm chooses to be 
acquirer (target); (ii) a matching function z T , t ( z ); (iii) prices P t ( z ) and r t ; (iv) number of entrants e t ; (v) distribution of ﬁrm 
size and productivity t ( k , z ); (vi) aggregate consumption C t , such that (a) ﬁrm and household problems are solved given 
prices; (b) distributions are consistent with ﬁrm decisions; (c) capital markets are cleared: ∀ measurable subset A ′ ⊆A t , its 
image set deﬁned by the matching function z T , t is z T , t ( A 
′ ) ⊆T t , then 
λ
∫ 
z∈ A ′ ,k 
ˆ k T,t ( z ) kdt (k, z) = 
∫ 
z∈ z T,t ( A ′ ) ,k 
( 1 − δ) kdt (k, z) ∀ A ′ ⊆ A (16) 
(d) goods market clears 
Y t = C t + 
∫ 
i d i + qe t+1 ˜  k t+1 (17) 
In Eq. (16) , the left hand side is the total demand of capital from acquiring ﬁrms z ∈ A ′ at time t . ˆ k T,t ( z ) is the demand 
of acquiring ﬁrms z per unit of capital. Among z , there is only a share λ that can acquire ﬁrms. Hence after multiplying 
ˆ k T,t 
(
z T,t ( z ) 
)
by ﬁrm size k and λ, we have the demand of targets’ capital from acquiring ﬁrms ( z , k ). Then we sum across 
all possible k and get the demand of targets’ capital from acquiring ﬁrms, conditional on productivity z . Integrating across 
all ﬁrms in set A ′ , we get total demand of capital for acquiring ﬁrms, whose productivity is in set A ′ . The right hand side of 
Eq. (16) is the total supply of the capital from target ﬁrms. The set of targets’ productivity is given by the image set z T , t ( A 
′ ), 
and the total capital of those ﬁrms is given by the right hand side. 18 
17 In this paper, the sales of individual machines is included in the internal investment process. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) and Lanteri (2016) study the 
allocations of used capital. However, M&A always dominates the sales of individual machines in the model since if ﬁrms only sell individual machines, the 
value of intangible asset is lost. 
18 To complete the deﬁnition of the equilibrium, we also need to deﬁne the off-equilibrium price. If the ﬁrm z 	∈ T chooses to become a target, the deviation 
price is deﬁned as 
P t ( z ) = sup 
{
p : there exists an acquirer ( z A , k A ) if matched 
with z at price p , payoff is same as V A t ( z A , k A ) 
}
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Fig. 3. Matching pattern of the model. 
4.1. Equilibrium at the micro level 
From the deﬁnition of equilibrium, we can see that the capital market clearing condition in our model is much more 
complicated than that in standard models: we have inﬁnite capital markets and all of them should satisfy condition (16) . 
The following two propositions show that we can simplify the capital market clearing condition under some assumptions. 
Given the functional form we assume in Section 3.2.2 , the next proposition shows a sorting pattern in M&A in the 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 3. There exists a ˆ ψ < 0 such that if ˆ ψ < ψ ≤ 0 , a cutoff value z ∗t exists such that λJ A t 
(
z ∗t 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) J I t 
(
z ∗t 
)
= J T t 
(
z ∗t 
)
. 
If z > z ∗t then ﬁrm chooses to be acquirer; if z < z 
∗
t , it chooses to become target. There is a positive assortative matching between 
acquiring ﬁrms’ productivity and target ﬁrms’ productivity: z T increases on z. 
Proof. See appendix 
The above proposition says that acquiring ﬁrms’ productivity is higher than target ﬁrms’ productivity. Intuitively, in our 
M&A technology, there are two parts: f ( z , z T ) measures the productivity change after M&A while v is the eﬃciency of absorb- 
ing target ﬁrms. If an unproductive ﬁrm acquires a productive ﬁrm, then potential output of M&A, f ( z , z T ) k T , is smaller than 
the target’s initial output z T k T . Given the eﬃciency of absorbing v smaller than 1, there is no gain when an unproductive 
ﬁrm acquires a productive target. 
Fig. 3 shows the equilibrium matching pattern. When ψ ≤ 0, our model equilibrium is summarized as: in each period 
when new entrants enter, fewer productive ﬁrms are acquired while productive ﬁrms survive. More productive acquiring 
ﬁrms buy more productive target ﬁrms. 
In the following parts, we assume ˆ ψ < ψ ≤ 0 . From the market clearing condition (16) and the positive sorting condition, 
we have 
λ
∫ z max 
z 
ˆ k T,t ( z ) kdt (k, z) = 
∫ z ∗t 
z T,t ( z ) 
( 1 − δ) kdt (k, z) ∀ z ≥ z ∗t (18) 
Comparing the above equation to condition (16) , we ﬁnd that (18) is much simpler: ﬁrst, z only chooses a unique target 
ﬁrm z T ; second, we do not need to solve market clearing conditions for any possible set A 
′ but only need to check the 
subsets above z . 
Eq. (18) deﬁnes the matching function. We also need two boundary conditions 
z T,t ( z 
∗
t ) = z min , z T,t ( z max ) = z ∗t (19) 
The above two equations say that acquiring ﬁrm z ∗t matches with z min , and z max matches with ﬁrm z 
∗
t . 
In Proposition 3 , there are two conditions. First, ψ should be smaller than 0. In a unidimensional sorting model (as 
Becker, 1973 ), positive sorting arises if in the M&A technology function f has positive cross partial derivative, f ′′ z T z > 0 . 
Given f is a CES function, f satisﬁes this condition for any ψ ≤ 1. In our model, acquiring ﬁrms trade off between buy- 
ing a small amount of capital from productive targets and buying a large amount of capital from unproductive targets. 19 
Proposition 5 says that to obtain the positive sorting on acquiring ﬁrms’ productivity and target ﬁrms’ productivity, we need 
stronger complementarity than that in Becker’s model. 
Second, ψ can not be too small. Consider the extreme case that ψ = −∞ . 20 Acquiring ﬁrms never buy ﬁrms that have 
different productivity. The equilibrium pattern in Fig. 3 will collapse. 
4.2. Balanced growth path 
The aggregate capital in this economy is deﬁned as 
K t = 
∫ 
kdt (k, z) (20) 
In other words, the deviation price is deﬁned as the best price that ﬁrm z can get to make some acquiring ﬁrms indifferent. 
19 Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) studies this “quality vs quantity” tradeoff in a static environment. 
20 Then function f collapses into Leontief function. 
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and we can deﬁne the total output of the economy as 
Y t = 
∫ 
z≥z ∗
[ 1 − λs ( z ) ] zkdt (k, z) + 
∫ 
z<z ∗
zkdt (k, z) (21) 
where λs ( z ) is the expected productivity loss of acquiring ﬁrm. 
In the following parts, we focus on the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium, which is deﬁned as: 
Deﬁnition 4. A Balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium with a constant g K > 1 such that (i) 
all value functions J A ( z ), J T ( z ), J ( z ), P ( z ) and policy functions do not depend on time t ; (ii) Y t , K t and C t grow with same speed 
g K . 
Let us deﬁne the ﬁrm growth rate as g A ( z ) = 1 − δ + ˆ  k ( z ) if the ﬁrm has access to the acquisition market, and g I ( z ) = 
1 − δ + ˆ  ı( z ) if the ﬁrm does not have access to the acquisition market. The following proposition shows that a BGP exists in 
the model. 
Proposition 5. The model has a BGP with constant growth rate g K such that g K is implicitly deﬁned by ∫ 
z≥z ∗
m ( z ) 
1 − ω 
g K 
(
λg A ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) 
)dz + M ( z ∗) = g K 
eμ
(22) 
Aggregate output is determined by 
Y t = ZK t (23) 
Z is the aggregate TFP 
Z = 
∫ 
z≥z ∗
( 1 − λs ( z ) ) z 
1 − ω 
g K 
(
λg A ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) 
)m ( z ) dz + ∫ z max 
z ∗
zm ( z ) dz (24) 
Proof. See appendix . 
We can interpret the BGP in this way: the cutoff z ∗ is a constant on the BGP. Firms with productivity above z ∗ always 
choose to invest. New entrants, if their productivity is below z ∗, always produce only one period and then sell all their 
capital. Therefore, acquiring ﬁrms are more productive, larger and older than target ﬁrms in a BGP equilibrium. Firms above 
z ∗ gradually become larger with growth rates g A ( z ) if they have access to acquisitions and g I ( z ) if they do not have access to 
acquisitions. 
On the BGP, the productivity distribution is ﬁxed and only the ﬁrm size grows. The shape of the size distribution is 
unchanged, but the distribution shifts to the right with a constant rate. The next proposition shows that the ﬁrm size 
distribution has a Pareto tail. 
Proposition 6. Deﬁne the average ﬁrm size as K¯ t and the relative size of ﬁrm j as 
k t ( j) 
K¯ t 
, and then the distribution of the relative 
size conditional on productivity has a Pareto tail 
lim 
x →∞ 
Pr 
(
k t ( j) 
K¯ t 
≥ x | z 
)
x −( z ) 
= constant (25) 
and ( z ) satisﬁes 
ω 
[
( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) ( z ) + λg A ( z ) ( z ) 
]
= g ( z ) 
K (26) 
and the unconditional distribution of relative ﬁrm has a Pareto tail with tail index ( z max ) 
lim 
x →∞ 
Pr 
(
k t ( j) 
K¯ t 
≥ x 
)
x −( z max ) 
= constant (27) 
Proof. See appendix . 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of ﬁrm size. Notes: The parameters are shown in Table 3 . 
The intuition of the Proposition 6 is as follows: conditional on the productivity, the ﬁrm growth rate does not depend 
on the size. Hence our model follows the Gibrat’s law conditional on the productivity. It is well known that Gibrat’s law 
generates a size distribution with Pareto tail ( Gabaix, 2009 ). Thus conditional on productivity, the ﬁrm size distribution has 
a Pareto tail. If all ﬁrms are pooled together, the most productive ﬁrm determines the tail of the size distribution. 
Perla and Tonetti (2014) studies a growth model in which unproductive ﬁrms can imitate productive ﬁrms. They start 
with a Pareto productivity distribution and get an equilibrium Pareto size distribution. However, in our model, productive 
ﬁrms try to raise the productivity of unproductive ﬁrms and the price is determined endogenously. In addition, starting from 
any productivity distribution, our model can generate a Pareto size distribution. Fig. 4 draws the shift of distribution of ﬁrm 
size. 21 The distribution has a right tail and shifts to the right with a constant rate, which is the aggregate growth rate of 
the economy. 
5. Quantitative analysis 
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence of our model’s implications. This section is organized as follows. We 
ﬁrst calibrate the parameters of the model from the M&A data at the micro level and compare our model with M&A pattern. 
Then we get more evidence from information of new-startups. Finally, we provide some evidence from aggregate data. 
5.1. Data 
We use two datasets. The ﬁrst one is the Compustat dataset. The second one is M&A transaction data from the Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum database (SDC). SDC collects all M&A transactions in US that involve at least 5% of the ownership 
change of a company where the transaction is valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, all deals are covered) or where the 
value of the transaction is undisclosed. We download all US M&A transactions from 1978 to 2012. In this paper, we only 
focus on M&A within the same industry. For most transactions, SDC contains a limited number of pre-transaction statistics 
on the merging parties, such as sales, employee counts and property, plant and equipment. In order to get more statistics, 
we merge the SDC dataset with the Compustat dataset. However, direct merging these two datasets is not possible since 
Compustat data only records most recent CUSIP codes while SDC data uses CUSIP codes at the time of M&A. Hence we ﬁrst 
use historical CUSIP information in the CRSP dataset and merge SDC data with CRSP data. Then we use CRSP identiﬁer to 
link with Compustat data. 77901 transactions are directly downloaded from the SDC dataset. After matching CRSP translator, 
we get 6608 transactions, for which we can ﬁnd CRSP identiﬁer (permno) of both acquirers and targets. After merging with 
Compustat data, we have 3255 transactions remaining without any missing information on sales, employee counts or total 
assets. We then deﬂate all the values using the US inﬂation rate. 22 
21 The parameters are used as the benchmark case in Section 5.2. 
22 We also try to deﬂate the data using industry price index. However, our results do not change too much. 
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Table 3 
Parameters. 
Parameters Value Moments 
M&A Tech 
h 0.81 M&A Intensive margin 
θ 0.05 Sales dif 
 0.35 z T / z 
1 
1 −ψ 0.67 Slope of M&A intensive margin 
1 − α 0.45 Slope of z T / z 
Other Params 
λ 0.35 M&A extensive margin 
v i 54.3 M&A/Output 
q 4.80 Firm growth rate 
σ z 0.47 Firm growth rate std. 
ω 0.85 Thorburn (20 0 0) 
μ 0.15 Dunne et al. (1988) 
Notes: This table reports the parameters used. M&A extensive margin = per- 
centage of ﬁrms whose acquisitions > 0; M&A intensive margin = P ( z T ) k T 
P ( z T ) k T + φ(i ) 
Table 4 
Moments of the data and model. 
Data Model 
Target sales/Acquirer sales 0.20 0.18 
z T 
z 0.65 0.59 
Slope of z T 
z 0.85 0.93 
Extensive margin 0.30 0.29 
Intensive margin 0.62 0.63 
Slope of Intensive margin 0.14 0.21 
M&A/Output 0.05 0.06 
Firm growth rate 0.065 0.070 
Firm growth rate std. 0.12 0.10 
5.2. Calibration 
To calibrate the model, we assume that consumer’s utility is U ( C ) = C 1 −γ1 −γ with γ = 3 . The model period is 1 year. And we 
choose the depreciation rate δ = 0 . 1 , the probability of survival rate ω = 0 . 85 , the size of new entrants μ = 0 . 15 ( Thorburn, 
20 0 0 ) and the discount factor β = 0 . 95 . 
We assume that the internal investment has a cost function as φ
(
ˆ ı
)
= v i 2 ˆ  ı2 . We choose v i to match the M&A intensive 
margin: the share of M&A in total investment ( 
P ( z T ) k T 
P ( z T ) k T + φ( i ) ). 
The productivity distribution of entrants m ( z ) is a truncated log-normal distribution. We normalize the mean of log 
productivity to be 1 and the standard deviation to match the ﬁrm growth rate dispersion. The log z max and log z min are two 
standard deviations away from the mean. q is calibrated to match the ﬁrm growth rate. 
The rest six parameters are related to the M&A technology: h , ψ , θ , α, ε and the probability of accessing M&A market λ. 
The idea of our analysis is to use the micro pattern in the M&A data to calibrate those parameters in the M&A technology. 
We calibrate them to jointly match the M&A share in total output, sales difference between acquiring and target ﬁrms, the 
productivity difference between target and acquiring ﬁrms 
z T 
z , the productivity matching function slope, extensive margin 
of the M&A and the slope of intensive margin. Extensive margin is the percentage of ﬁrms with acquisitions > 0 in the 
Compustat database. The slope of intensive margin is the slope of regressing log M&A intensive margin on log ( z ). The 
parameters are shown in Table 3 . 
Intuitively, M&A/output tells us the level of M&A cost. It helps us to calibrate h . The relative sales between targets and 
acquirers shed light on the forgone cost sz . We use this moment to calibrate θ . Next, the slope of intensive margin implies 
the slope of price P ( z T ). It is helpful to calibrate ε. 
23 Finally, 
z T 
z and the slope of 
z T 
z tell us how to transform k T into k M . We 
calibrate ψ and α to match these two moments. 
ε = 0 . 35 indicates that in M&A transactions, only 65% of the acquirers’ productivity would be passed to newly merged 
ﬁrms. α = 0 . 55 means that there is a strong decreasing returns to scale on absorbing large target ﬁrms: when the relative 
size of the target increases by 1%, the absorbing eﬃciency decreases by 45%. 
Table 4 reports the target moments of the data and the model. The model replicates the data moments reasonably well. 
We can see that target ﬁrms are smaller and less productive than acquiring ﬁrms, 24 consistent with the model prediction. 
23 In Eq. (11) , taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to z T and assuming ψ = 0 , we can get that P t ( z T ) = X t z T ε α , where X t is a constant that is 
determined in the equilibrium. 
24 David (2013) also documents this fact. 
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It is useful to compare the parameters in our model with those in the human capital literature. We take acquiring ﬁrms 
as parents and the target ﬁrms as children. There is a large amount literature studying how the parents’ investment change 
the human capital of children. Ben-Porath ( 1967 , Eq. (2)) assumes that children can spend time to increase their human 
capital. He uses a functional form s θ , while θ ranges from 0.5 to 0.8. Our θ is much smaller. It is because the temporary 
productivity drop of acquiring ﬁrms is not large. In Cunha et al. ( 2010 , Eq. (2.3) and (2.4)), they study the complementarity 
between parents’ and children’s abilities using a CES functional form, similar to what we use. Their elasticity of substitution 
1 
1 −ψ ranges from 0 to 5 ( Cunha et al., 2010 ). Our choice of parameter is within this range. 
5.3. Positive sorting pattern in M&A 
Our model predicts the positive sorting pattern between productivity of acquirers and targets. Fig. 5 plots the sorting 
matching pattern of acquiring and target ﬁrms. The top graph plots the sorting pattern of productivity, which is measured by 
log sales minus log assets. The horizontal line is the productivity of the acquiring ﬁrm and the vertical line, the productivity 
of the target ﬁrm. We can see a strong positive assortative matching pattern on productivity: more productive acquirers 
tend to buy more productive targets. The linear ﬁt function has a signiﬁcant slope coeﬃcient of 0.85 while the intercept is 
0.79. The bottom graph plots the matching pattern of log productivity in the model. We plot log z on the x-axis and log z T 
on the y-axis. There are two lines in the graph. The solid blue line is the matching function implied by the model. We can 
see that when log z is approximately 0.9, the ﬁrm is indifferent between target and acquirer choice (the x-axis starts at 0.9 
while y-axis ends at 0.9). The dashed red line is the linear ﬁt function, with a slope of 0.93 and an intercept of −1.05. 
Our model predicts that ﬁrms segment themselves with z > z ∗ becoming acquirers and z < z ∗ targets. The most produc- 
tive target is less productive than the least productive acquirer. This is not consistent with the data. One potential explana- 
tion in our model is that the productivity of acquirers will drop temporarily. When we measure the acquirers’ productivity 
in the acquisition period, we may underestimate their productivity. Another possible reason is that it is diﬃcult to identify 
who is the acquirer in the data sometimes. Acquirers are deﬁned as “those ﬁrms who initiate the acquisitions” in the SDC 
dataset. However, it may be the case that advanced knowledge ﬂows from targets to acquirers. 
5.4. Growth decomposition of US economy 
In this section, we explore a counterfactual experiment to understand how M&A can affect the growth rate. We shut 
down internal investment channel and M&A channel one by one. The results are shown in Table 5 . The ﬁrst column is an 
economy in which ﬁrms can grow only through M&A. The second column is an economy where ﬁrms can grow only through 
internal capital accumulation. The third column is the benchmark model: ﬁrms can grow through both channels. We can 
see that when only M&A exists, the growth rate is about 1.81%, while when only internal capital accumulation exists, the 
growth rate is about 2.90%. Combining them together, we get the growth rate about 3.01%. 
We interpret the model with only internal investment (second column) as an exercise to evaluate the contribution of 
internal capital accumulation to growth. We ﬁnd that the aggregate growth rate in our model will decrease from 3% to 2.9%. 
Greenwood et al. (1997) has emphasized the importance of internal investment. They ﬁnd that internal investment can 
account for about 60% of US GDP growth rate. Our model, without the innovation of productivity z , predicts a larger effect 
of internal investment. By comparing the second and third columns, we ﬁnd that when shutting down M&A the change of 
growth rate is as high as 0.1%. 
We interpret the model with only M&A (ﬁrst column) as an exercise to evaluate the importance of technology spillover. 
It is interesting to compare our paper with Perla and Tonetti (2014) and Lucas Jr and Moll (2014) . In their models, pro- 
ductivity is imitated on costly contact. The growth in their models is solely driven by the improvement in the productivity 
distribution: unproductive ﬁrms can increase their productivity by paying a contact cost. However, it is diﬃcult to quantify 
the effect of this channel on aggregate growth. In our model, we consider the M&A as a means of improving productivity. 
The technology spillover is not driven by imitation, but caused by improving unproductive ﬁrms’ productivity in the M&A. 
Under an appropriate M&A cost function, our model should be isomorphic with their models. Our results suggest that the 
technology spillover is a signiﬁcant contributor to the aggregate growth. It can explain about 60% (1.81%/3.01%) of the GDP 
growth rate. 
Table 5 
Growth contribution of M&A and internal capital accumulation. 
Only M&A Only internal investment Both 
Growth rate 1.81% 2.90% 3.01% 
Firm growth rate 4.81% 5.61% 7.05% 
TFP 5.85 4.89 5.21 
Notes: This table shows the aggregate gains in three cases: ﬁrms can 
grow only through M&A, ﬁrms can grow only through internal invest- 
ments and ﬁrms can growth through both channels. 
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Fig. 5. Productivity sorting pattern in M&A. Notes: This ﬁgure presents the log productivity matching patterns in the data and the model. Productivity in 
data is deﬁned as ln(z) = ln(sales)-ln(assets). The dashed lines are the linear ﬁts of the matching functions. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level 
and standard errors are reported in brackets. Data source: SDC M&A database. 
Besides the growth rate, the third row compares aggregate TFP. Literature on capital reallocation has discussed how 
misallocation of resources can decrease the aggregate TFP, such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , Midrigin and Xu (2014) and 
David (2013) . Our paper conﬁrms this perspective. We can see that when shutting down the whole M&A process, TFP 
decreases by about 5% (1–4.89/5.21). 
To understand the magnitudes of these effects, we can think from Eqs. (1) and (15) . Combining them together, we can 
get 
( 1 + r ) ∝ g γK ∝ 
∫ 
J ( z ) m ( z ) dz 
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Fig. 6. Timing in the model extension. 
The formula shows that the change of growth rate is determined by the change of ﬁrm expected value. Because the M&A 
can smooth the investment cost, compared to solely internal investment, M&A can increase the ﬁrm expected value. The 
magnitude of the M&A effect depends on the curvature of the internal investment cost and the M&A cost. Table 4 shows 
that conditional on doing M&A, the intensive margin of M&A is over 60%, which implies that the curvature of the M&A cost 
is small. As such, the M&A has a signiﬁcant effect on aggregate growth rate. 
In reality, M&A may hurt the eﬃciency. 25 Our model does not take it into account. However, we take our results in 
Table 5 as an upper bound of the aggregate effect of M&A. 
5.5. Robustness 
In our current model, we assume that the productivity of the acquirer will jump back in one period (ﬁgure 1). Can 
the speed of the convergence change our result signiﬁcantly? To check the robustness, we extend our model so that the 
acquirer’s productivity requires multiple periods to recover. For simplicity, we assume it will take 2 periods. Then the ﬁrm 
will have one more state variable: the time it chooses to absorb the target ﬁrm in the last period. 
To make it clear, suppose a ﬁrm ( z , k ) acquires a target ﬁrm and spends s −1 to absorb the target in the last period, as 
shown in Fig. 6 . 26 If the ﬁrm does not acquire any new target in this period (internal investment only), the ﬁrm will only 
produce ( 1 − s −1 ) zk . Thus the productivity drop will stay for two periods. If the ﬁrm acquires a new target in this period, 
the ﬁrm needs to choose s to absorb the target ﬁrm and the output in the current period is ( 1 − s ) ( 1 − s −1 ) zk . 
The value of the acquiring ﬁrm can be deﬁned as 
V A t ( z, k, s −1 ) = max 
s,z T ( j ) ,k T ( j ) ,i 
{ 
( 1 − s −1 ) zk − M t ( s, ( 1 − s −1 ) z, z T , k, k M ) − I ( i, k ) 
+ ω 
1 + r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ , s 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 (z, k ′ , s ) , V T t+1 (z, k ′ , s ) 
]} (28) 
s.t. k ′ = (1 − δ) k + i + k M , and (5), i ≥ 0 , k T ≥ 0 , s ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] 
The value of the internal growth ﬁrm is 
V I t ( z, k, s −1 ) = max 
i 
{
( 1 − s −1 ) zk − ( i, k ) 
+ ω 
1+ r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)
, V T t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)]} (29) 
s.t. k ′ = (1 − δ) k + i , i ≥ 0 
And the value of the target is 
V T t ( z, k, s −1 ) = max 
k ′ ≥0 
{ 
( 1 − s −1 ) zk + P t ( z ) 
+ ω 
1 + r t max 
[
λV A t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)
+ ( 1 − λ) V I t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)
, V T t+1 
(
z, k ′ , 0 
)]} ) (30) 
s.t k ′ = ( 1 − δ) k − 
25 In the ﬁnance literature, M&A can be driven by the CEO’s “empire building” motive. While in the IO literature, M&A can be driven by the motive to 
increase the monopoly power. Both will hurt the aggregate eﬃciency. 
26 s −1 = 0 if the ﬁrm does not acquire any ﬁrm in the last period. 
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Table 6 
Growth contribution of M&A and internal capital accumulation: model 
extension. 
Only M&A Only internal investment Both 
Growth rate 1.63% 2.92% 3.01% 
Firm growth rate 4.49% 5.68% 7.01% 
TFP 5.53 4.90 5.14 
Notes: This table shows the aggregate gains in three cases: ﬁrms can 
grow only through M&A, ﬁrms can grow only through internal invest- 
ments and ﬁrms can growth through both channels. 
The Eqs. (28) , (29) and (30) are deﬁned in a similar way as the benchmark model, with the extension that the produc- 
tivity convergence will happen in two periods. The problems are linear in the capital again. Thus we can redeﬁne the value 
per capital as J A t ( z, s −1 ) = 
V A t ( z,k,s −1 ) 
k , J 
I 
t ( z, s −1 ) = 
V I t ( z,k,s −1 ) 
k and J 
T 
t ( z, s −1 ) = 
V T t ( z,k,s −1 ) 
k , where 
J A t ( z, s −1 ) = max 
s, ˆ k ≥0 
{ 
( 1 − s −1 ) z − c A t 
(
s, z, , s −1 , ˆ  k 
)
+ ω 
1 + r t 
(
1 − δ + ˆ  k 
)
J t+1 ( z, s ) 
} 
(31) 
s.t. c A t 
(
s, z, , s −1 , ˆ  k 
)
= min 
z T ( j ) , ˆ k T ( j ) 
{ 
φM t 
(
s, ( 1 − s −1 ) z, z T , ˆ  k M 
)
+ φ
(
ˆ ı
)} 
(32) 
ˆ k M ≥ 0 , ˆ  ı ≥ 0 and ˆ k = ˆ  ı + ˆ  k M 
J I t ( z, s −1 ) = max 
ˆ k ≥0 
{ 
( 1 − s −1 ) z − φ
(
ˆ k 
)
+ ω 
1 + r t 
(
1 − δ + ˆ  k 
)
J t+1 ( z, 0 ) 
} 
(33) 
J T t ( z, s −1 ) = ( 1 − s −1 ) z + ( 1 − δ) P t ( z ) (34) 
J t+1 = max 
(
λJ A t+1 + ( 1 − λ) J I t+1 , J T t+1 
)
(35) 
The Eqs. (31) –(35) are similar as the benchmark model. The only exception we want to highlight is that in the problem 
(31) , the optimal choice of s is not a static problem any more. Increasing s can change the cost of investment c A t through 
the current forgone cost s ( 1 − s −1 ) zk and the absorbing eﬃciency. Moreover, it can also affect the value in the next pe- 
riod J t+1 ( z, s ) because the productivity will stay at low level for two periods. The equilibrium is deﬁned the same as the 
benchmark model. 
We calibrate the model and decompose the growth contribution of M&A in the same way as the benchmark model. 
Table 6 shows our decomposition result. First, we still interpret the gap between the model with “only internal investment”
(the second column) and the third column as the growth contribution of the M&A. Compare with Table 5 , the contribution 
of M&A slightly declines from 0.1% to 0.09%. This is because the M&A becomes less eﬃcient: the productivity drops for 
longer time. Second, when looking at the aggregate TFP, we ﬁnd a similar pattern. The aggregate TFP will drop by 4.7% 
(1–4.90/5.14) when removing M&A. The effect is slightly smaller than the benchmark model (5%). Thus we conclude that if 
the acquirer’s productivity jumps back more slowly, it may decrease the contribution of the growth effect of M&A. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study how M&A can affect the aggregate economy. In particular, we highlight the positive effects of 
M&A process on aggregate growth rate. Applying the model to the data, we argue that M&A is a quantitatively important 
driving force of aggregate growth, which has been neglected in previous academic research. Moreover, we assume that 
the cost of M&A depends on the relative distance between acquiring and acquired ﬁrms. This assumption can help us to 
understand the relation between M&A pattern and growth across countries, as well as some industry dynamics. 
In our model, the M&A process is solely driven by the consideration of eﬃciency, while in reality M&A can increase 
the market power thereby harming some aspects of the market eﬃciency, which we do not explicitly model in the paper. 
Although our model may exaggerate the eﬃciency gain of M&A, it is useful to take our paper as a benchmark. To fully 
understand how M&A affects the aggregate economy, future research may introduce market power and strategic concern 
into the model. 
In this paper, we focus solely on US M&A. As cross-border M&A is increasingly popular, it may also be interesting to 
study how M&A affect the cross-country differences in an open economy. 
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Appendix 
The appendix has three parts. The ﬁrst part shows proofs of propositions; the second part explains the numerical method 
to solve the model; the last part documents that the used capital reallocation does not have a positive sorting pattern. 
A1. Proof of Propositions 
A1.1. Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof. First, we show that in the acquisition process, the productivity of the acquirer is higher than the productivity of the 
target. This comes from the assumption of the M&A technology. The productivity of the target after the acquisition is ˆ zT , 
which is smaller than acquirer’s productivity z and larger than target’s original productivity z T . Hence it must be the case 
that a more productive ﬁrm acquires less productive ﬁrms otherwise there is no gain in the acquisition. 
Second, we argue that in the acquisition process, the matching pattern is positive sorting if ψ ≤ 0. The proof is to verify 
whether in a positive sorting equilibrium, the second order condition holds. Deﬁne ˆ f 
(
z T 
z 
)
= 
[ 
1 − ε + ε 
(
z T 
z 
)ψ ] 1 ψ 
. In Eq. (11) , 
the ﬁrst order condition of s yields 
s = 
[ 
θ
α
P t ( z T ) 
z 
(
ˆ k M 
h ˆ  f 
) 1 
α
] α
θ+ α
(36) 
Then we have the cost of acquisition is 
φM t 
(
s, z, z T , ˆ  k M 
)
= sz + P t ( z T ) 
(
ˆ k M 
hs θ ˆ f 
) 1 
α
= Hz θθ+ α P ( z T ) 
α
θ+ α
(
ˆ k M 
ˆ f 
) 1 
θ+ α
(37) 
where H is a constant H = 
(
1+ θα
)(
α
θ
) θ
( θ+ α) 
h 
1 
θ+ α
. 
Given J ( z ), the choice of investments can be written as two separate problems 
max 
z T , ˆ k M 
[ 
ω 
1 + r J ( z ) ˆ
 k M − Hz 
θ
θ+ α P ( z T ) 
α
θ+ α
(
ˆ k M 
ˆ f 
) 1 
θ+ α
] 
(38) 
and 
max 
ˆ ı
[ 
ω 
1 + r J ( z ) ˆ ı − φ
(
ˆ ı
)] 
(39) 
Eq. (39) is the optimal decision of internal investment and the Eq. (38) is the optimal decision problem of M&A. To discuss 
M&A pattern, we only need to focus on (38) . We redeﬁne some new variables to make Eq. (38) cleaner: Hz 
θ
θ+ α
(
ˆ k M 
ˆ f 
) 1 
θ+ α = x, 
F ( z, z T , x ) = ω 1+ r J ( z ) ˆ k M and w ( z T ) = P ( z T ) 
α
θ+ α . The problem can be written in a short way such that 
max 
z T ,x 
F ( z, z T , x ) − w ( z T ) x 

Lemma 7. The equilibrium has a positive sorting pattern iff
F xx F zz T − F xz F xz T + F xz 
F Z T 
x 
≥ 0 (40) 
Proof. See Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) . 
Our next job is to verify that the above condition (40) is right iff ψ ≤ 0. After substituting all equations into condition 
(40) , we can show that 
F xx F zz T − F xz F xz T + F xz 
F Z T 
x 
∝ ˆ f d 
2 ˆ  f 
d zd z T 
− d ˆ
 f 
dz 
d ˆ  f 
dz T 
Hence F xx F zz T − F xz F xz T + F xz 
F Z T 
x ≥ 0 ⇔ ˆ f d 
2 ˆ  f 
d zd z T 
≥ d ˆ f 
dz 
d ˆ f 
dz T 
. This condition is true if ψ ≤ 0. 
As we argue in the paper, as long as ψ is large enough and smaller than 0, a positive sorting equilibrium exists. 
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A.1.2. Proof of Proposition 5 
Proof. From Proposition 3 , we can see that if ﬁrms are in the acquirer set A then they quit the market only via exogenous 
death shocks. The mass of new entrants with productivity z is em ( z ). Then after t − τ periods, only ω t−τ fraction survives. 
Hence at time t , the mass of ﬁrms that enters at period τ with productivity z is 
n t,τ ( z ) = eω t−τm ( z ) when z ≥ z ∗ (41) 
n t,τ ( z ) = 
{
e if τ = t 
0 if τ < t 
when z < z ∗ (42) 
Firm’s growth rate is g A ( z ) when the ﬁrm can acquire target ﬁrms and g I ( z ) if it can not. If z ≥ z ∗ , the aggregate capital of 
ﬁrms that enters at period τ with productivity z is 
∑ 
j∈ z 
S t,τ ( j ) = ˜ k τn t,τ ( z ) 
t−τ∑ 
n =0 
(
t − τ
n 
)
λn ( 1 − λ) t−τ−n g A ( z ) n g I ( z ) t−τ−n (43) 
= ˜ k τn t,τ ( z ) 
[
λg A ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) 
]t−τ
(44) 
The above equation says that in period t the aggregate capital of ﬁrms, whose productivity is z and age is t − τ, is equal to 
the initial capital of entrants k¯ τ multiplied by the expected growth rate and the number of ﬁrms. Then we can simplify the 
aggregate capital in Eq. (18) as 
K t = e 
∫ 
z≥z ∗
t ∑ 
τ=0 
˜ k τω 
t−τ g¯ ( z ) t−τm ( z ) dz + eM ( z ∗) ˜ k t (45) 
where g¯ ( z ) = λg A ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) . Aggr egate capital has two parts in (45) . The ﬁrst part is the capital of the acquiring 
ﬁrms. S t , τ ( z ) is the total capital of the acquiring ﬁrms z at time t . The second part is the capital of target ﬁrms that only 
live one period. Their size is S t,t ( z ) = ˜  k t n t,t ( z ) and they have a mass n t,t ( z ) = em ( z ) . Guess that K t grows with a constant 
rate g K . Then 
K t = e 
∫ 
z≥z ∗
t ∑ 
τ=0 
μK t g 
τ−t 
K ω 
t−τ g¯ ( z ) t−τm ( z ) dz + eM ( z ∗) μK t (46) 
From consumer problem, we can see if u ( C ) = C 1 −γ1 −γ , then 
1 
1 + r t = β
C 
−γ
t+1 
C 
−γ
t 
= β
g 
γ
K 
When γ increases, we can see that 1 1+ r t decreases. The growth rate of the ﬁrm decreases as well. Given parameters, we 
numerically verify 
ω 
g K 
g¯ ( z ) < 1 , ∀ z 
Then (46) can be simpliﬁed as equation (22) . 
A.1.3. Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof. Let us denote ﬁrm as j and its size as k t ( j ). We then have 
k t ( j ) 
K¯ t 
= g ( j ) k t−1 ( j ) 
K¯ t−1 
+ ε (47) 
In Eq. (47) , 
g ( j ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
g A ( j ) 
g K 
with prob ωλ
g I ( j ) 
g K 
with prob ω ( 1 − λ) 
0 with prob 1 − ω 
ε denotes the capital of new entrant ε = μ if g ( j ) = 0 . Otherwise ε = 0 . Notice that E ( g ( j ) ) = ω 
(
λg A ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) 
)
< 1 
from proposition 8. Then we have the following lemma. 
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Lemma 8. If g A ( z ) > 1, then there exists ( z ) > 0 such that 
ω 
(
λg A ( z ) ( z ) + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) ( z ) 
)
= g ( z ) 
K (48) 
and the conditional distribution of ﬁrm size satisﬁes 
lim 
x →∞ 
Pr 
(
k t ( z ) / ¯K t > x | z 
)
x −( z ) 
= c ( z ) for z such that g A ( z ) > 1 (49) 
where c ( z ) is a constant. 
Proof. See Kesten (1973) . 
The above lemma says that conditional on ﬁrm productivity z , the ﬁrm’s size distribution has a Pareto tail. Hence the 
distribution Pr 
(
k t ( j ) 
K¯ t 
> x 
)
is a mixture of different Pareto distributions. 
Denoting min = min { ( z ) } , we have 
Pr 
(
k t ( j ) / ¯K t > x 
)
x −min 
= 
∫ Pr (k t ( j ) / ¯K t > x | z )
x −min 
f ( z ) dz (50) 
= 
∫ 
g A ( z ) ≤1 
Pr 
(
k t ( j ) / ¯K t > x | z 
)
x −min 
m ( z ) d z + 
∫ 
g A ( z ) > 1 
Pr 
(
k t ( j ) / ¯K t > x | z 
)
x −min 
m ( z ) d z 
In the ﬁrst part, when x → ∞ , lim x →∞ Pr ( S t ( z ) >x | z ) 
x −min 
= 0 since ﬁrms enter with size ε with a boundary support, while 
growth rate is less than 1 for these ﬁrms. Their size will shrink. Hence when x is larger than the upper bound of 
ε support, Pr 
(
k t ( j ) 
K¯ t 
> x | z 
)
= 0 . In the second part, if z ∈ arg min { ( z ) } , we have lim x →∞ Pr ( k t ( j ) / ¯K t >x | z ) 
x −min 
= c ( z ) otherwise 
lim x →∞ Pr ( S t ( z ) >x | z ) 
x −min 
= 0 . Then we have 
lim 
x →∞ 
Pr 
(
k t ( j ) / ¯K t > x 
)
x −min 
= 
∫ 
z∈ arg min { ( z ) } ,g ( z ) > 1 
c ( z ) m ( z ) dz (51) 
Lemma 9. ( z ) is decreasing on z. Hence z max = arg min { ( z ) } and min = ( z max ) 
Proof. Taking derivative in Eq. (48) , we have 
d
dz 
= − λg 
A −1 dg A 
dz + ( 1 − λ) g I −1 dg 
I 
dz 
λg A ( z ) ( z ) ln g A + ( 1 − λ) g I ( z ) ( z ) ln g I 
The numerator is greater than 0 since g A and g I are strictly increasing in z . Denote F ( ) = ω λg A  + ω ( 1 − λ) g I  = 1 . The 
denominator is dF 
d
. Considering a small  > 0, we can see F (  + ) = ω λ
(
g A 
)+
 + ω ( 1 − λ) 
(
g I 
)+
 . + > 1 , and 
hence from Jensen inequality, we have 
1 = F ( ) + < F (  + ) 
We have dF 
d
> 0 . Thus d
dz < 0 . 
Then we can simplify Eq. (51) as lim x →∞ 
Pr ( k t ( j ) / ¯K t >x ) 
x −min 
= c ( z max ) m ( z max ) 
A.2. Numerical algorithm to solve BGP 
In Eq. (11) , the ﬁrst order condition of z T yields 
α
P ′ t ( z T ) 
P t ( z T ) 
= 
(
z T 
z 
)ψ 
1 − ε + ε 
(
z T 
z 
)ψ 1 z T (52) 
From Eq. (18) , taking the derivative with respect to z on both sides, we get 
z ′ T,t ( z ) = 
λ
∫ 
k 
ˆ k T,t ( z ) kdt ( k, z ) 
( 1 − δ) ∫ k kdt ( k, z T ( z ) ) (53) 
= 
λ m (z) 
1 − ω g K ( λg 
A ( z ) + ( 1 −λ) g I ( z ) ) 
( 1 − δ) μm ( z T ( z ) ) 
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Table 7 
The propensity of aircraft reallocation. 
(1) (2) 
log z it −0.072 ∗
(0.050) 
log z jt 0.037 ∗∗∗
(0.006) (
log z it 
z jt 
)2 
0.006 
(0.005) 
log z it−1 −0.055 
(0.041) 
log z jt−1 0.031 ∗∗∗
(0.004) (
log z it−1 
z jt−1 
)2 
−0.003 
(0.004) 
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes 
Aircraft ﬁxed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 343 343 
Notes: This table shows the propensity that two ﬁrms will trade 
an aircraft. The standard deviations are reported in the paren- 
theses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denote statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The second equality uses the property that the growth rate of acquiring ﬁrms is time invariant on the BGP. The above 
two ODEs, (52) and (53) , and the two boundary conditions determine the equilibrium. To solve the equilibrium, we follow 
the steps: 
(1) Guess the interest rate r and P ( z min ) 
(2) Guess the ﬁrm growth rates g A ( z ) and g I ( z ), as well as the cutoff productivity z ∗
(3) Solve the price function P ( z T ) and matching function z T ( z ) from two ODEs (52) and (53) , with boundary conditions 
P ( z min ) and z T ( z 
∗) = z min 
(4) Solve the ﬁrm problem (10) to problem (14) . Update the ﬁrm growth rates, g A ( z ) and g I ( z ), as well as z ∗. Go back to 
step 2 until convergence. 
(5) From the free entry condition (15) and the boundary condition z T ( z max ) = z ∗, we can update the guess of r and 
P ( z min ). 
(6) The measure of new entrant e , aggregate output Y and aggregate consumption C are determined by Eq. (17) , (22) and 
(23) . 
A.3. The used capital reallocation and the M&A 
This section provides the evidence that the used capital reallocation and the M&A are different. Usually, we cannot only 
observe the sellers’ and the buyers’ information at the same time on the used capital market. We are aware of only one 
exception: the aircraft secondary market. We can track the history of aircraft ownerships. Thus we observe when a ﬁrm 
buys a plane from another ﬁrm, and consider it as a used capital reallocation rather than an M&A. 
We use the database of commercial aircraft complied by a producer computer based information system. 27 The data 
reports the history of each Western-build commercial aircraft up to April 2003. For each aircraft serial number, the dataset 
contains information on the type (e.g. Boeing 737); the age of the aircraft and the sequence of the owners with the relevant 
dates of operations. We match the name of the operators with the Compustat. At the end, we know the portfolio of aircraft 
of each operator and the transaction date of each aircraft. 
We use a series of logit regressions to examine the factors that inﬂuence the propensity for any two ﬁrms to trade the 
aircraft. Let us denote an aircraft by a , the current holder by i and the potential buyer by j . Y ai jt = 1 means that the aircraft 
a is sold to j from ﬁrm i in period t. And Y ai jt = 0 means that the aircraft a is not traded between i and j . We then regress 
Y aijt on the productivity distance 
z 
i t 
z jt 
. If the pattern is similar as the M&A pattern, we should observe an inverted U shape 
between 
z 
i t 
z jt 
and the propensity of used capital reallocation Y aijt : the buyer wants to buy the aircraft from a similar ﬁrm. 
The results are in Table 7 . We measure the productivity of the ﬁrm using the sales over total assets. In the ﬁrst column, 
we control the aircraft ﬁxed effect and the year ﬁxed effect. The coeﬃcients before z it is signiﬁcantly negative and the 
coeﬃcient of z jt is positive. It means that more productive ﬁrm is more likely to buy an aircraft from a less productive ﬁrm. 
However, the coeﬃcient before 
(
log 
z it 
z jt 
)2 
is close to 0 and not signiﬁcant. Thus we do not see a pattern that “the ﬁrm 
27 See Gavazza (2011) for details of the dataset. 
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buy capital from a similar ﬁrm”. In the second column of Table 7 , we lag the productivity by one year. The result does not 
change signiﬁcantly. 
One possible interpretation is that the buyer can directly use the aircraft and replace the aircraft productivity with the 
buyer’s productivity. However, acquiring an airline company is more than getting aircrafts. Digesting the target ﬁrm is not 
easy if two ﬁrms are not similar. 
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